hinese demand for food imports resulted in a significant increase in global cropland and higher profits for farmers exposed to this demand shock. It further highlights that this Chinese food shock served as the main impetus for global deforestation over the p…
Also visible in the figure is another, less publicised shock to the global economy: after joining the WTO in 2001, China quickly went from being a net exporter of agricultural products to being the world's largest importer. China currently imports more than 10% of all internationally traded agricultural goods, and more than 5% of global agricultural production. How did the world manage to supply China without apparent disastrous consequences for the world's poor? And what about the broader question of how global agriculture adjusts to large demand shocks? The empirical literature contains few answers, which may seem surprising until one realises how hard it is to disentangle cause and effect. Although a more substantial liberalisation of agricultural imports followed China's accession to the WTO in 2001, China still kept a policy of self-sufficiency in important food crops, notably maize, rice, and wheat. The Party reconfirmed the policy in response to the publication of Brown's book to assure global leaders that China could indeed feed itself. The green curve in Figure 2 shows that the extent of global cropland, which had been stagnating for a decade, began to increase after China liberalised imports of certain crops in 1995. The pace increased after China joined the WTO in 2001, leaving the extent of global cropland 7% larger in 2020 than in 1995.